

# Practical Virtue Ethics

Christine Swanton

Renewed attention to virtue and vice has resulted in a wealth of “virtue ethical” articles which deal with, for example, environmental virtues and vices, and the notion of the virtuous lawyer or doctor (such as “the lawyer as friend”). This development is to be applauded, for it greatly enriches the moral landscape and focuses attention on the ethical nature of agents in their aspects as beings of character (*see* CHARACTER; MORAL CHARACTER; VIRTUE). Nonetheless, to explicate specific virtues and vices is not *ipso facto* to proffer a distinctively virtue ethical approach to applied ethics. Thus, the question of what counts as virtue ethics is important in the practical application of virtue ethics as a distinctive type of moral theory (*see* VIRTUE ETHICS).

Clearly, if virtue ethics is defined *via* its main traditional source, ancient eudaimonistic virtue ethics, it will become controversial at the very least to class, for example, Hume as belonging to a virtue ethical tradition (*see* HUME, DAVID). Yet, it is clear that virtue and vice are central in his normative ethics. A *definition* should be broad enough to accommodate a family of virtue ethical theories, where Aristotle might be seen as paradigmatic, and there could be debate about whether others, such as Nietzsche, could reasonably be seen as virtue ethicists (*see* NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH). As a basic first step then, I suggest the following definition:

Virtue ethical theories hold that virtue notions are central in forms of evaluation of humans and their lives, resulting in a distinctive kind of moral theory.

According to this definition, conceptions of the various virtue notions shape the way the important issues in morality are theorized. For example, aspects of virtue (e.g., their qualities as dispositions of the agent, their targets, or aims) may be central in significant areas of moral theorizing such as objectivity, the role of impartiality and partiality in ethics, and conceptions of right action. The definition clearly leaves room for debate about how central virtue notions should be in a theory if it is to be called virtue ethical, and how distinctive it should be if it is not to be called, for example, a type of Kantian or consequentialist ethics (*see* KANT, IMMANUEL; KANTIAN PRACTICAL ETHICS; CONSEQUENTIALISM).

This essay focuses on central theoretical issues in the application of virtue ethics generally rather than on specific applications, or a critique of specific forms of applied ethics from a virtue ethical point of view (*see* ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE ETHICS; ANIMALS, MORAL STATUS OF; MORAL STATUS). These issues came to the fore when Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 paper “Modern Moral Philosophy” ushered in a new era of substantive moral theorizing with the revival of virtue ethics as a major type of moral theory. Anscombe’s view – that “it would be a great improvement if instead of ‘morally wrong’

one always named a genus such as ‘untruthful’, ‘unchaste’, ‘unjust’” (Anscombe 1958: 10; *see* ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.) – suggests that applied ethics would be improved and enriched if we focused on virtue terms as applied to acts. Unfortunately, despite this claim, virtue ethics has been thought to be “agent-centered” rather than “act-centered,” and this thought has in turn spawned conceptions of a contrast between act- and agent-centered moral theories that are overdrawn, and which obscure the issues (Stohr 2006: 22).

For example, the contrast has led to an understanding of the distinction between “duty-imposing” reasons and “virtue-making” (aretaic) reasons (*see* DEONTOLOGY), where the former “define acts as prohibited, permissible or obligatory” whereas the latter “classify behaviour as suberogatory, neutral or supererogatory” (Stohr and Wellman 2002: 69; *see* REASONS FOR ACTION, MORALITY AND). Duty-imposing reasons are captured by rules, and hence the idea is born that virtue ethics is concerned with character rather than rules; character rather than action (*see* CHARACTER). Indeed, the common view that, for virtue ethics, character traits are “fundamental,” is thought to have the implication that, for virtue ethics, moral reasons for action must come from within the agent rather from what would normally be thought to make actions right (Stohr and Wellman 2002: 68). (This implication is rejected by Hursthouse [1999] and Swanton [2003].) All this is not auspicious for the idea that virtue ethics can take its place as a theory providing a virtue-centered conception of right action, and action guidance. No wonder then that virtue ethics has often been thought to be of limited or no use in applied ethics (Louden 1984: 229).

An essay on practical virtue ethics must deal with this common objection to virtue ethics by showing just how virtue ethics may conceive of right action, moral rules, and the action guidingness of ethics.

## **Virtue Rules, Moral Principles, and Right Action**

An old debate in the application of virtue ethics concerns the alleged dichotomy between virtue ethics and rule ethics, the supposed inability of virtue ethics to account for moral rules, and its consequent supposed impotence in applied ethics. Rosalind Hursthouse’s (1999) notion of a V-rule has put to bed the idea that virtue ethics cannot do justice to the commonsense idea that there are moral rules. “V-rules” are rules containing a “thick” virtue or vice concept as applied to acts, for example, “Be kind,” “Don’t be unjust” (*see* THICK AND THIN CONCEPTS). Since moral principles are generally thought to be essential to practical ethics, the relation between V-rules and moral principles is a central issue of practical virtue ethics.

An immediate problem is the limited nature of such rules if there are only few virtues, but many kinds of virtue ethics recognize a wide variety of virtues and vices, especially if inspired by Hume or Nietzsche. Hence, we could countenance such commonsense rules as “Be polite,” “Don’t be morose,” “Be attentive,” “Be affectionate,” “Be amiable.” By contrast, as Aristotle notes, some virtues do not have names so it is possible for some acts to be virtuous and right without those acts conforming to an existing V-rule.

In this section, I reject the analyses of V-rules as moral principles that are “decisive”; that is, which yield determinate judgments about which actions are right.

According to Crisp (2000), V-rules are “decisive” in the following way. If an action is properly describable as just, kind, honest, for example, and thus conforms to a V-rule, it cannot be wrong. This initially surprising view, one might think, can be supported by the following argument:

- (a) A virtue such as kindness is a state of moral perfection.
- (b) “Kind act” means an act of the sort a virtuous person would perform in the field or sphere of the virtue of kindness.
- (c) The doctrine of the “unity of the virtues” is true. That is, the virtues are unified by practical wisdom, for genuine practical wisdom can be possessed only if one possesses all the virtues.

Therefore:

- (d) A kind act cannot be a wrong act.

The idea that V-rules constitute decisive moral principles raises an issue that is neglected, but crucial, to practical virtue ethics: what is the nature of the “thick” virtue concepts when applied to acts as opposed to character? The preceding argument makes the assumption that virtue concepts as applied to acts are understood in terms of what virtuous agents would do. But should “just acts,” “honest acts,” and “kind acts,” for example, be understood in terms of the choice of a virtuous agent in the sphere of operation of the relevant virtue (its field)? Consider the following case, discussed by Crisp. An invigilator notices that a student is cheating. She also knows that “this particular student is usually quite conscientious, and that her parents are in the process of breaking up” (Crisp 2000: 45). Surely it will be claimed that there is a conflict between kindness and justice? But this is denied by Crisp: “If the right thing to do in this case is to keep quiet, then it would be wrong to speak out. Indeed, speaking out, because it would be going wrong within the sphere governed by justice, would be a kind of injustice” (Crisp 2000: 45). Crisp is right to claim that the action lies within the sphere or field of justice, but can it be the case that an invigilator who, in her role as invigilator, respects the rules of the relevant institution aimed at securing justice in the assessing process, by speaking out, can nonetheless be described as acting unjustly, if hiding the transgression is right? To employ another example, if it is the case that a lie may on occasion be right, lying will be both dishonest and right. We cannot say that, where lying is overall right, lying is a kind of honesty. Honesty as applied to actions, then, does not mean “right, in the field of honesty.”

If this is so, how do we understand the “thick” virtue concepts as applied to acts? Let us call such acts “V-acts.” I suggest the following:

- (VA) A V-act is an act with features characteristic of actions performed by agents with virtue V, in the field of V.

These characteristic features, which make various acts *kind* acts, for example, are acts such as helping someone cross the road, comforting a depressed person, talking to a lonely stranger, or thoughtfully sending a gift. Properties *in virtue* of which an act is, for example, kind, have been called by both Dancy (1993: 85) and Little (2000) as “naturally shapeless,” so they need unification by a conception of the evaluative point of virtue concepts as applied to actions. Without that evaluative point or concern, those concepts could not play a role in a moral outlook. As Williams (1995: 206) puts it, “to understand how such a concept can be applied to a new sort of situation, it is likely that one will have to grasp its evaluative point, the outlook of the people who use it.” In traditional virtue ethics, this evaluative point is given by the characteristic perspective of a virtuous agent; hence, the “shapeless” descriptive features of a virtue are unified by their being characteristic of actions performed by agents with that virtue, as specified in (VA) above.

Dancy (1993: 85) notes that neither the features by virtue of which an act is kind, nor its evaluative point or “concern,” are “independently intelligible,” and that both are required for a correct understanding of the thick virtue and vice concepts as applied to acts. Because what counts as a V-act is fixed in part by the descriptive features in virtue of which an act is, for example, kind, (VA) allows for the possibility that virtuous agents acting virtuously will not always perform V-acts (such as kind acts, or honest acts) in the field of V. V-rules, then, are not decisive moral principles.

For virtue ethics, the V-rules specify reasons for action (V-reasons). The fact that an act is generous is a reason for doing it. It is a live issue whether such reasons should be understood as necessarily *always* having positive moral valence – that is, for example, whether the kindness of an act is always a right-making feature of an act, analogous to Ross’s *prima facie* duties (see ROSS, w. D.). On a radically particularist view, where a reason counts in favor of an action in one context (even if overridden by weightier reasons), it may not do so in another context (Dancy 2004; see PARTICULARISM). Finally, reasons specified in the V-rules may be defeasible generalizations assuming theoretically privileged contexts where V-reasons do not change valence (Lance and Little 2006).

We turn now to virtue ethical conceptions of rightness of action. For Aristotle (see ARISTOTLE), rightness is connected with practical truth or correctness: “To arrive at the truth is indeed the function of intellect in any aspect, but the function of practical intellect is to arrive at the truth that corresponds to right appetite” (Aristotle 1139a16–b2). The idea of rightness as practical truth or correctness should not be confused with the idea that that an action’s rightness depends on what the action “does” or “brings about,” and does not depend on her inner states,” notably motives (Russell 2009: 39). This is because the correctness or incorrectness of an action with respect to some virtues may lie at least partly on an agent’s inner states. For example, an action may be wrong because it is uncaring, and the wrongness may consist at least in part on uncaring mental states (the agent may be overly detached, hostile, have overly paternalistic attitudes, and so on).

Though virtue in general *aims* at truth (and not *merely* at reasonableness or excellent motivation), it may miss its target. For this reason, a virtue-centered conception of right action arguably should not be understood in terms of the choices of a virtuous agent (as in Hursthouse 1999). Though “virtue aims to hit the mean” (truth in practical matters) (Aristotle 1106b16–24), for the virtuous have both practical wisdom and fine motivation, including the “correctness of the end at which [they] aim” (Aristotle 1144a7–8), it is not clear that real-life virtuous agents always succeed in hitting it, an achievement which is “praised and recognized as a success” (1106b 16–24).

Indeed, according to Curzer (2005), Aristotle gives several types of example of virtuous agents getting it wrong in action. For example, Aristotle claims that it is characteristic of the liberal man to carry giving too far because it is in his nature (Aristotle 1121a1–7; Curzer 2005: 237). However, this kind of giving must be sufficiently rare if the agent is deemed to have the *virtue* of liberality. As Swanton (2003) points out too, a human virtuous agent is not omniscient, and may make mistakes that are not blameworthy. Furthermore, like Hume, Aristotle does not expect a virtuous agent to necessarily act rightly when such an act is pardonable “because the alternative is too much for human nature, and nobody could endure it” (Curzer 2005: 237; see Aristotle 1110a23–6).

All this appears to be at odds with Aristotle’s claims that the mean is as the *phronimos* determines it, and the *phronimos* is virtuous. However, it is open to us to understand the former claim as epistemological when applying to real-life virtuous agents. For Aristotle, in the absence of universal principles governing most situations, and given the complexity of hitting the mean (for the mean has many dimensions, including acting in the right manner, on the right occasions, at the right time, to the right extent, with respect to the right people and objects, deploying the right instruments, and for the right reasons [Aristotle 1106b18–23; Hursthouse 1980–1]), there are many ways of missing the targets of the virtues. The authoritative figure for determining what is right is indeed in characteristic cases, the virtuous. However, a virtuous agent may not be an expert in a specialized field (as Aristotle himself concedes), or though wise in his culture or milieu, may have a limited perspective, or she may be ignorant of facts of which all the wise are ignorant.

Schematically then, right actions on this virtue-centered view hit the mean: that is, the targets of the virtues. The mean in relation to action is “what is appropriate and fitting in action” or “what we nowadays call ‘right action’ broadly understood” (Russell 2009: 18). Which “dimension” of the mean has salience in assessing an action as right depends not only on context but also on the virtue. Caring acts emphasize feeling, motive, and manner; just acts less so, if at all. As a “mean condition” a virtue is constituted by practical wisdom not only in situational appreciation of manner, timing, and so on, but also in motive, reason, and feeling. But how practical wisdom operates in the various virtues will also vary – as far as creative virtue is concerned, creativity in the highly talented may be experimental, “unwise,” and “imprudent” (as Nietzsche claims) in a way not at all appropriate in the just judge or responsible parent.

Of course, this virtue ethical account of practical truth as hitting the mean – hitting the targets of the virtues in relation to action – provides a framework only for

assessing right action. Determining the targets of the various virtues requires an account of the nature, point, and function of the various virtues themselves in the good life, and as Aristotle claims (with some qualification), in a particular situation, it is characteristically the virtuous themselves who are best qualified to judge those targets in any given situation.

The problem of the virtuous agent having characteristically privileged access to the right raises the issue of the action guidingness of virtue ethics, to which we now turn.

## Action Guidance

In a well-worn criticism of virtue ethics, it cannot offer action guidance, and is hence flawed as a practical theory. However, according to Hursthouse (1999), the V-rules provide a form of codifiability weaker than the “strong codifiability” possessed by a set of principles which provide a complete decision procedure usable by the virtuous and the non-virtuous alike (1999: 39–40). The search for strong codifiability is by now widely considered to be a failed enterprise; its demands are unreasonable and unsatisfiable (Hursthouse 1999: 40).

However, is it the case that the kind of codifiability offered by the V-rules is too weak to be acceptable in applied and professional ethics (*see* PROFESSIONAL ETHICS)? The problem is that the V-rules are too abstract and vague in application and can thus all too often be applied only by the virtuous whose insights are not necessarily transparent or publicly accountable. The problem is resolvable if we recognize that virtue concepts have a “prototype” structure. This allows for a distinction between virtues in what might be called their “basic” form, for example, generosity as such, and virtues in their “differentiated” form, for example, generosity as a business executive, generosity as a friend.

Virtues (whether basic or differentiated) can be seen as conforming to a general model of concepts as prototypes having the following features.

- 1 The concept is not defined by a list of features having the status of necessary and sufficient conditions of application.
- 2 Because the concept cannot be defined by a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, its descriptive specification can only be offered at relatively high levels of abstraction, particularly in the case of basic virtues. Hence, the V-rules, particularly those understood in terms of such concepts (e.g., “Be generous”) cannot be usable universal principles under which all or even most cases can be subsumed.
- 3 The concept is “flexible and malleable,” allowing it to be imaginatively extended to novel and more specialized types of cases (Johnson 1993: 191). For example, basic virtue concepts can be extended to roles.
- 4 At the same time, a concept of virtue as basic (e.g., generosity as such, in abstraction from, say, generosity in one’s role as a lecturer) provides anchors for our moral thought about virtue, by supposing relatively unchanging core

features which allow the application to specialized or novel cases (e.g., roles) to be constrained by those features.

- 5 Those core stable features are provided by contexts of learning (Churchland 1989: 299) by, for example, combinations of “mother’s knee” rules, basic emotions, or exemplars (such as paradigmatically or iconic virtuous agents).

Let us illustrate these features. Generosity as such must be distinguished from the extension of that prototype to more specialized cases, such as the generosity of a chief executive officer of a business firm. As Wright (2010: 106) claims too, “one is courageous in the role of a bystander, or epistemically careful in the role of a doctor.” In professional and applied ethics, practical wisdom concerns not just generosity or courage as such, but involves a more specialized mastery, notably mastery of rules relevant to one’s role. And of course, part of such mastery is respect for role requirements of transparency and public accountability. For example, an employee’s courage manifested as whistleblowing is the courage of an *employee*, and such courage must exhibit a wisdom that takes the form of sensitivity to and respect for proper procedure.

As stated in feature 3, such differentiation of virtue does not mean that the basic V-rules are redundant; on the contrary, they provide anchors for our moral thought. Respecting them prevents role virtue (such as the disposition of a defense lawyer to be loyal to her client, as manifested in zealous advocacy) from lapsing into role vice (such as the disposition of what has been called hyper-zeal [Dare 2004; Swanton 2007]). For the same reason, differentiation of virtue is not a mandate for moral relativism. For example, although many virtues such as dispositions of politeness and hospitality will vary legitimately according to different cultural conventions, one can criticize cultural manifestations of virtue by reference to their basic prototypes.

Although role virtue is one important form of differentiated virtue in professional ethics, other types of differentiations exist. The following types are salient:

## 1 Specialization

### (a) Roles

### (b) Circumstances of the agent, for example, the amount of wealth she has

For example, Aristotle’s virtue of *megalopsychia*, in Russell’s (2009) view, is best read as a specialized virtue of the basic virtue of generosity possessed by those of great wealth, and having public benefaction as its specialized primary end. Hence, it is a specialized virtue of both types (a) and (b). Liberality is generosity of those of lesser wealth.

## 2 Location in both time and place

### (a) Cultural location

### (b) Historical location

For example, the virtue of assertiveness in the past manifested as defending one’s honor in ways dependent on one’s social standing and conventions of the time. Conditions of scarcity, war, and so on may change the nature of generosity, hospitality, trust, and other virtues.

### 3 Nature of the agent

- (a) Personal talents
- (b) Personal strength (Swanton 2003)
- (c) Gender (perhaps)
- (d) Phase of life (Slote 1983; Welchman 2005)

### 4 Narrative context

The question arises: why not just speak of contextual sensitivity in the expression of the basic virtues? My answer is that the contouring of basic virtues in the above ways involves important and distinct features of character, and their taxonomy as types of differentiated virtue indicates that systematic theorizing about, for example, role virtue-differentiation and narrative virtue-differentiation can be instructive. For example, a person good in a role must be generous, kind, and fair but cannot just be generous, kind, and fair; these traits need to be contoured by respect for authority and procedure.

It may be thought that basic virtue, when differentiated, can turn basic V-rules into highly specific universal principles providing action guidance according to the model of subsumption under principle. However, this hope is chimerical; imaginative extension in the differentiation of prototype according to such factors as narrative context does not lend itself to such precision. One important problem is that it is not even always clear what prototype is to be extended into areas of differentiation (Swanton 2007), and much moral imagination and wisdom may be required to have a suitably nuanced view.

I conclude with a homely example. Consider what it is like to be good and act rightly as a mother-in-law in her dealings with her daughters-in-law, in regard to such areas as their young babies. The models of virtuous *qua* friend and virtuous *qua* mother are fraught with difficulty, suggesting that these kinds of bonds are not quite appropriate. However, a mother who has no daughters may feel strong bonds to one or more of her daughters-in-law. Imaginative extension of virtue prototypes is no easy matter in a wide variety of practical contexts.

**See also:** ANIMALS, MORAL STATUS OF; ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.; ARISTOTLE; CHARACTER; CONSEQUENTIALISM; DEONTOLOGY; ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE ETHICS; HUME, DAVID; KANT, IMMANUEL; KANTIAN PRACTICAL ETHICS; MORAL CHARACTER; MORAL STATUS; NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH; PARTICULARISM; PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; REASONS FOR ACTION, MORALITY AND; ROSS, W. D.; THICK AND THIN CONCEPTS; VIRTUE; VIRTUE ETHICS

## REFERENCES

- Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. "Modern Moral Philosophy," *Philosophy*, vol. 33, 1–19.
- Churchland, Paul 1989. *A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Crisp, Roger 2000. "Particularizing Particularism," in Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (eds.), *Moral Particularism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 23–47.



- Curzer, Howard 2005. "How Good People Can Do Bad Things: Aristotle on the Misdeeds of the Virtuous," in David Sedley (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXVIII*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 233–56.
- Dancy, Jonathan 1993. *Moral Reasons*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dancy, Jonathan 2004. *Ethics without Principles*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Dare, Tim 2004. "Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers," *Legal Ethics*, vol. 7, pp. 24–38.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind 1980–1. "A False Doctrine of the Mean," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 81, pp. 57–72.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind 1999. *On Virtue Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Johnson, Mark 1993. *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lance, Mark Norris, and Margaret Olivia Little 2006. "Defending Moral Particularism," in James Dreier (ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 305–21.
- Little, Margaret Olivia 2000. "Moral Generalities Revisited," in Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (eds.), *Moral Particularism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 276–304.
- Louden, Robert 1984. "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, pp. 227–36.
- Russell, Daniel C. 2009. *Practical Intelligence and the Virtues*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Slote, Michael 1983. "Relative Virtues," *Goods and Virtues*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Stohr, Karen 2006. "Contemporary Virtue Ethics," *Philosophy Compass*, vol. 1, pp. 22–7.
- Stohr, Karen, and Christopher Heath Wellman 2002. "Recent Work on Virtue Ethics," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 39, pp. 49–72.
- Swanton, Christine 2003. *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Swanton, Christine 2007. "Virtue Ethics, Role Ethics, and Business Ethics," in Rebecca L. Walker and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), *Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 207–24.
- Welchman, Jennifer 2005. "Virtue Ethics and Human Development: A Pragmatic Approach," in Stephen M. Gardiner (ed.), *Virtue Ethics Old and New*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 142–55.
- Williams, Bernard 1995. "Replies," in J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (eds.), *World, Mind, and Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 185–225.
- Wright, Sarah 2010. "Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism," *Metaphilosophy*, vol. 41, pp. 95–114.

## FURTHER READINGS

- Aristotle 1976. *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. J. A. K. Thomson, rev. H. Tredennick. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Dare, Tim, and Wendel W. Bradley (eds.) 2010. *Professional Ethics and Personal Integrity*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind 1995. "Applying Virtue Ethics," in R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn (eds.), *Virtues and Reasons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind 1996. "Normative Virtue Ethics," in R. Crisp (ed.), *How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kronman, Anthony T. 1986. "Practical Wisdom and Professional Character," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 4, pp. 203–34.

- Oakley, Justin, and Dean Cocking 2001. *Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pellegrino, Edmund D. 1995. "Toward a Virtue-Based Normative Ethics for the Health Professions," *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, vol. 5, pp. 253–77.
- Slote, Michael 2001. *Morals from Motives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stangle, Rebecca 2008. "A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics," *Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 58, pp. 665–78.
- Walker, Rebecca L., and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.) 2007. *Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Welchman Jennifer (ed.) 2006. *The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics*. Indianapolis: Hackett.