Course syllabus

SEMESTER 2, 2020

15 points

 

Course Director: John Bishop   <jc.bishop@auckland.ac.nz>

Teacher: John Bishop 

Student class representative: Jenny Jung <jjun088@aucklanduni.ac.nz>

Tuakana mentor (for Stage II/III Philosophy): To be advised

 

Course delivery format: One 2-hour lecture and one optional discussion hour per week

(Timetable and room details can be viewed on Student Services Online.)

Discussion sessions will not begin until the second week of Semester (that is, the first sessions will be held on Monday 3 August).

 

Well-being always comes first We all go through tough times during the semester, or see our friends struggling. There is lots of help out there - for more information, look at this Canvas page, which has links to various support services in the University and the wider community.

Course Information

Philosophy of Religion deals with the key question whether it is justifiable to hold religious beliefs, and, if so, under what conditions. (Do the best ways of living require religious commitment – or do they just allow it, as an optional extra? Or ought we to ‘grow out of’ religious beliefs and practices altogether?) Do justifiable religious beliefs have to be ‘reasonable’ – and, if so, in what sense of ‘reasonable’? Religious beliefs are often claimed to be held ‘by faith’. What does that mean? If religious beliefs are a matter of faith, may they also be held reasonably?

Our key question concerns the justifiability of holding and acting on religious beliefs. But what are ‘religious’ beliefs? We will take as our main example the core beliefs of the theist religious traditions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), since these are the religious traditions which are most directly influential in Western philosophy. We will consider how to understand the concept of God as it functions in these ‘Abrahamic’ traditions, and examine Anselm’s ‘Ontological Argument’ which rests on the idea that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought.

We will next consider whether theist belief may be shown to be reasonable from an initially uncommitted perspective, by considering contemporary versions of two major arguments of natural theology (Teleological and Cosmological). We will then consider the prospects for showing the unreasonableness of theist belief, paying particular attention to the Argument from Evil (i.e., the argument that the existence of serious suffering counts against the reasonableness of belief in a morally perfect and omnipotent God). We will examine attempts to reply to this Argument by constructing theodicies, and by appealing to human cognitive limitation (‘skeptical theism’).

A case for holding the view that the evidence for and against God’s existence is ‘evidentially ambiguous’ will thus emerge. The remainder of the course deals with a range of possible responses to evidential ambiguity, including (1) taking a ‘non-realist’ turn by arguing that religious language should not be regarded as descriptive of mind-independent reality; (2) arguing that theist beliefs may be justifiably held as basically evident in experience (as urged by ‘Reformed Epistemologists’), (3) emphasising the importance of subjective decision (as urged by Kierkegaard); and (4) defending the permissibility under certain conditions of believing ‘by faith’ beyond the evidence (as urged by William James), which we will consider in relation to Pascal’s famous ‘Wager’ Argument for believing in God on practical grounds.

Recommended Textbook:  Brian Davies, An Introduction to The Philosophy of Religion, 3^rd edition (Oxford University Press, 2004)

Course Programme:

Lecture 1 (28 July): Introduction

What is the Philosophy of Religion, and why does it matter? Philosophy of Religion considers whether holding and acting on religious beliefs is justifiable. Much contemporary work focusses on theist religious traditions, and makes two presuppositions:

(i) that it is justifiable to hold religious beliefs only if they are held reasonably, which requires that they be held on the basis of adequate arguments or evidence for their truth (the Evidential Presupposition); and

(ii) that the core content of theist belief is belief in God, understood as ‘the personal omniGod’: the supernatural omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect personal agent who is Creator and Sustainer ex nihilo of all (else) that exists (the Content Presupposition).

Both these presuppositions may be questioned: is the idea that God is a supremely powerful Person too anthropomorphic, limiting God’s absoluteness and transcendence? does the idea of trying to justify religious beliefs rationally overlook the role of faith in religious beliefs?

What happens when we try to justify religious beliefs rationally? And how might we do this? It is commonly assumed that to justify a religious belief we would require good reasons or arguments or adequate evidence for its truth. What sorts of reasons or arguments can be given, then, in favour of religious beliefs? We will attempt a taxonomy of justifications for theist belief, and make some preliminary observations about whether they are rationally persuasive or not.

Lecture 2 (4 August): The Concept of God

How may we clarify the concept of God in the theist traditions? Is God a person or personal being? Or is God the absolute and transcendent ultimate reality, ‘Being itself’? We will consider Davies’ distinction between ‘classical theism’ and ‘theistic personalism.’

Reading: “Concepts of God”, Chapter 1, in Davies, An Introduction to The Philosophy of Religion.

 

Lecture 3 (11 August): The Ontological Argument

Anselm (Archbishop of Canterbury, 1093-1109 CE) famously pondered in prayer on the implications of God’s being that than which a greater cannot be thought. We will consider for ourselves what these implications are: do they yield an a priori proof that God exists?

Reading: Anselm, Proslogion, Chapters 2-4.

Further reading: Exchange between Anselm and Gaunilo, in Brian Davies, ed., Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology (Oxford University Press, 2000), 311-326.

 

Lecture 4 (18 August): The Teleological Argument

The tradition of natural theology aims to provide independent grounds for God’s existence (i.e., grounds which do not appeal to alleged revelation). We consider two natural theological arguments, focussing on contemporary versions. The first is the Teleological, or ‘Design’ Argument, and its most current version, the ‘Argument from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe’.

Reading: Robin Collins, ‘God, Design, and Fine Tuning’ in Raymond Martin and Christopher Bernard, eds, God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Longman Press, 2002), 1-24.

Further reading: Brian Davies, An Introduction to The Philosophy of Religion, Chapter 4.

Richard Swinburne, ‘Argument from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe’ in John Leslie, ed., Physical Cosmology and Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 154-173;

Elliot Sober, ‘The Design Argument’ in Neil A. Manson, ed., God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science (New York: Routledge, 2003), 27-54.

 

Lecture 5 (25 August): The Cosmological Argument

Our second case study in contemporary natural theology: William Lane Craig’s revival of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.

Reading: William Lane Craig, ‘The Cosmological Argument’ in Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser, eds, The Rationality of Theism (Routledge, 2003), 112-131

Wes Morriston, ‘Must the Beginning of the Universe have a Personal Cause?: A critical examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument’, Faith and Philosophy 17 (2000), 149-169.

Further reading: Brian Davies, An Introduction to The Philosophy of Religion, Chapter 3.

William Lane Craig, ‘Must the Beginning of the Universe have a Personal Cause? A Rejoinder’, Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), 94-105;
Wes Morriston, ‘Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument: Reply to Craig’, Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), 233-244.

 

Lecture 6 (1 September): The Argument from Evil (1)

Is there a natural atheology? Does the existence of evil in the world provide evidence sufficient to establish that God does not exist? We will consider the ‘logical’ Argument from Evil as directed, specifically, against ‘personal omniGod theism’; replies to the Argument (the construction of speculative theodicies) – in particular, Free Will Theodicy.

Reading: J.L.Mackie,‘Evil and Omnipotence’, reprinted in Michael Martin and Ricki Monnier, eds, The Impossibility of God (Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books, 2003), 61-72.

Further reading: Brian Davies, An Introduction to The Philosophy of Religion, Chapter 10 [and for Lecture 7 also].

Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974), Chapter 9.

Nelson Pike, ‘Hume on Evil’ in William Rowe, ed., God and The Problem of Evil (Blackwell, 2001), 57-73.

 

MID-SEMESTER BREAK

 

Lecture 7 (22 September): The Argument from Evil (2)

Consideration of the ‘evidential’ version of the Argument from Evil, and the ‘skeptical theist’ reply.

Reading: William Rowe, ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), 335-341
Stephen J. Wykstra, ‘The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984), 73-93.

Further reading: William Rowe, ‘Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (2006), 79-92.

 

Lecture 8 (29 September): Evidential Ambiguity and its Implications

Examination of natural theology and natural atheology may suggest that the evidence for and against theism is ambiguous: all our evidence may equally well be understood in a coherent and integrated way either theistically or naturalistically.

But could this ambiguity itself be the basis for a natural atheological argument? We will consider J.L.Schellenberg’s Argument from Divine Hiddenness, and Paul Moser’s response.

Would the evidential ambiguity of theism require suspension of belief? Or could theistic commitment be reasonable even in the face of evidential ambiguity? Could commitment to theistic religious belief be justifiable even though it was not epistemically justified?

Reading: Debate between J.L. Schellenberg and Paul K. Moser in Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon, eds, Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2004), 30-58

 

Lecture 9 (6 October): The Falsification Debate; Theological Non-Realism

A possible response to evidential ambiguity is to adopt a non-realist understanding of theist claims. When people use religious language, what are they doing? Are they engaged in the same kind of activity as when they use scientific or common sense factual language? If not, does it follow that talk about God should be given a non-realist construal (as Don Cupitt and Lloyd Geering have advocated)? We will consider a classic debate from the mid-1950s arising Antony Flew’s claim that theological language isn’t factual because it is not ‘falsifiable’.

Reading: Antony Flew, R.M. Hare and Basil Mitchell, ‘Theology and Falsification: A Symposium’ in Charles Taliaferro and Paul Griffiths, eds, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 105-110.

Further reading: Charles Taliaferro, Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Malden, MA, Blackwell, 1998), 40-55.

 

Lecture 10: (13 October): Reformed Epistemology

Could it be justifiable to believe that God exists even though one does not do so on the basis of rational inference from more basic beliefs? (If so, there need be no evidential ambiguity – the truth of theism may be directly evident in experience, as with the truth of perceptual beliefs.) We will examine Alvin Plantinga’s defence of ‘Reformed Epistemology’, and his concept of properly basic belief.

Reading: Alvin Plantinga, ‘Warranted Belief in God’, in Eleonore Stump and Michael J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Blackwell, 1999), 285-297.

Further reading: Brian Davies, An Introduction to The Philosophy of Religion, Chapter 2, 37-41.

 

Lecture 11: (20 October): Fideism: Kierkegaard

Finally, we will consider fideist responses to evidential ambiguity – i.e., responses that affirm the justifiability of commitment ‘by faith’ without the support of evidence. We begin by considering Kierkegaard’s arguments against ‘objective reasoning’ in religion.

Reading: Kierkegaard, ‘Objective and Subjective Reflection’, in David Stewart, Exploring The Philosophy of Religion (Prentice-Hall Inc, 1980), 150-154.

Further reading: Robert Adams, ‘Kierkegaard’s Arguments against Objective Reasoning in Religion’ in The Virtue of Faith, (Oxford University Press, 1987), 25-41.

 

Lecture 12: (27 October): Fideism: William James

An examination of James’s famous ‘justification of faith’ in his lecture ‘The Will to Believe’. We will consider James’s assessment of Pascal’s Wager.

Reading: William James, ‘The Will to Believe’ in The Will to Believe and Essays in Popular Philosophy (Dover, 1956), 1-31.

Blaise Pascal, Pensées (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1908), 66-69.

 

 

Assessment: Coursework Essay and Final Examination

Your overall grade in the course will be the grades achieved on (i) a coursework essay (worth 50%) and (ii) a final 3-hour examination (worth 50%). At Stage II, a 2,000-word coursework essay is required; at Stage III, a 3,000 word essay. There will be a different final examination appropriate to each Stage – at both Stages, however, candidates will be asked to answer three questions.

 

Coursework Essay

Write an essay of not more than 2,000 words (for PHIL 207), or not more than 3,000 words (for PHIL 327), on one of the following topics.

The due date is Monday 5 October at 5 p.m.  Please submit an electronic copy of your essay through Canvas.

(1)       Explain Brian Davies' distinction between 'classical theism' and 'theistic personalism'. Is it correct to understand the God of theism as a person, like ourselves only unimaginably greater in power, wisdom and goodness? Could there be viable theistic conceptions of God which are non-personal?

(2)        Does Anselm's Ontological Argument establish that God exists, and exists as a matter of necessity? If not, is there any other conclusion that the Argument succeeds in showing to be true?

(3)        What is the ‘new’ Teleological Argument? What’s new about it? Is it more successful than the ‘old’ version?

(4)        What are the conclusions of the Kalam Cosmological Argument as revived by Willian Lane Craig? Does the Argument succeed? Give reasons for your answer, making sure that you consider objections to the position you seek to defend.

(5)        State the Argument from Evil as an argument for atheism. What would theists have to do in order to defend the reasonableness of their belief against the force of this Argument? Do you think they can succeed?  

 

Essays should be properly referenced. Please consult the ‘Referen©ite’ website for further information:

http://www.cite.auckland.ac.nz/

 

Doing coursework assists your learning and your acquisition of philosophical skills. It is also important that you submit coursework in case you are ill at the time of examinations. If you make an application for an aegrotat pass or compassionate consideration no recommendation can be made unless there is good evidence, provided by coursework results, of your ability in the course concerned.

Final Examination

The final examination will be a 3-hour examination, in which you will be asked to answer THREE unseen essay questions chosen from a list of questions. This list will contain at least one question related to each of the lecture topics on the course. (Note that you should not simply repeat material from your coursework essay in your examination answers.)

 

Examinations are held in the three weeks at the end of each semester after lectures finish. The examination times are noted in the information for each course on Student Services Online, the University’s on-line enrolment system. If you accidentally miss an examination you should go immediately to the Examinations office. If you are ill or suffer some other problem that seriously interferes with your examination performance or preparation, and wish to apply for aegrotat or compassionate consideration, you should consult the Examinations Office and see Student Health or Counselling urgently. (Do NOT wait to see your results first!) You should always sit your examination if at all possible.

 

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